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I. THE PROBLEMS OF L.A. LAW'S POPULARITY
It's "an old story" that lawyers are immoral because in their role
they "hire out their Words and Anger."' It's an old story that lawyers'
ethical obligations are determined by an amoral morality that
excludes "all hazards and costs . . . to ... [themselves]." 2 But these
tales are not told on L.A. Law, the popular television series.3 On L.A.
Law, legal practice reveals and tests lawyers' character. On L.A. Law,
neither the requirements of the lawyer's role nor the Bar's ethical
rules primarily determine the choices lawyers make. Rather, L.A.
Law is a soap opera in which action is determined by the characters'
"character." 4 On L.A. Law, lawyers' practices reveal their character.
Conflicts between the dispositions of its characters and the demands
* Robert Eli Rosen is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Miami. This
Essay was written while Professor Rosen was a Fellow in the Program in Ethics and the
Professions at Harvard University. University of Miami law students in his professional
responsibility courses during the 1986-87 academic year developed the insights that form the
foundations of this Essay; to them it is gratefully dedicated. This Essay also has benefited from
the comments of Arthur Applbaum, Jeremy Paul, Dennis Thompson and David Trubek.
1. M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 29 (1980) (emphasis in original) (quoting a
characterization of lawyers in THE SPECTATOR No. 21 (1711)). For a recent retelling, see
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIs. L.
REV. 29, 91-113.
2. 2 CAUSES CLEBRES: TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE (3 rev. ed. 1874) (speech of Lord
Henry Brougham). For a recent retelling, see Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role.- A
Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
3. L.A. Law (NBC weekly television series).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 42-48. For the meanings of "character," see infra
note 16.
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of professional obligations often create the dramatic incidents on L.A.
Law. These conflicts are both resolved and evaluated within the con-
straints of L.A. Law's soap opera frame. L.A. Law presents lawyers'
words and anger so that lawyers' characters may be judged.
It is an old story that "the public confuses the morality of a law-
yer with that of his client."5 This tale, too, is not shown on L.A. Law.
L.A. Law lawyers represent innocents accused, but they also represent
the guilty and the unsavory. Such representations produce plot com-
plications, not damning criticisms. On L.A. Law, client character is
relevant to, but distinct from, lawyer morality. Not necessarily
tainted by their clients, L.A. Law lawyers are even likeable.6 L.A.
Law's reception suggests that the public is not so morally immature
that it "assumes that a profession which is willing to counsel dishon-
est and unworthy clients is itself unworthy and dishonest."7
L.A. Law lawyers question the character of their own and each
other's clients as well as the propriety of their representations. The
duty of lawyers to provide access to justice sometimes is raised. For
L.A. Law lawyers, however, the imperatives of the adversary system
usually are not sufficient to answer ethical questions. L.A. Law tests
professional obligations by the hazards and opportunities legal prac-
tice poses to the character of lawyers. Questionable representations
often are undertaken because they offer opportunities for further reve-
lation of the lawyer's character. Reprehensible clients may be repre-
sented, it suggests, but only if the lawyer has the ability to act in
character in the vicissitudes of the representation. L.A. Law's recep-
tion suggests that the public assumes that law is a desirable profession
when lawyers' characters are revealed and tested in their work.
L.A. Law is not high art. It is not even consistently high quality
television drama. Yet, in this Essay, I take L.A. Law seriously. One
reason for analyzing L.A. Law is that it is a popular imagining of
lawyers. It deserves professional attention because it brings "law into
the consciousness and understanding of the public at large."' I elabo-
5. Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal Ethics,
40 MD. L. REV. 451, 456 (1981); see also, K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR
LAW AND ITS STUDY 149 (hardcover ed. 1960) ("The public does not always understand...
[the] grave danger in thus lumping counsel and client.").
6. O'Connor, Likeability can become a Liability, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1987, § 2, at 35.
7. Luban, supra note 5, at 456.
8. ABA COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, ..... .. IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAW PROFESSIONALISM 53 (1986)
(quoting an A.B.A. Stanley Commission interview with Professor Paul Freund, December 3,
1985, in which Professor Freund explains the obligation for law professors to contribute to
public education about the law); see also id. at 47, 53 ("All segments of the Bar should ...
[e]ducate the public about legal processes and the legal system.") (emphasis omitted).
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rate the account of legal ethics that L.A. Law brings to the public. I
find in it a cultural critique of legal ethics. For us, cultural commit-
ments demand that lawyers be afforded the opportunity, within struc-
tured limits, to display more of their character than is demanded by
current patterns of practice and interpretations of legal ethics.
In depicting character as ethically significant, L.A. Law suggests
that explicating the scope of lawyers' obligations requires considering
not only an impersonal moral standpoint, but also the virtues and
personal commitments of actors. The elaboration of this suggestion
has been the subject of serious efforts that vary depending on the
account given "of the sources of morality, the conditions of practical
rationality, and the overall motivational economy of the soul."9 L.A.
Law does not provide a serious elaboration, but I take L.A. Law seri-
ously to respond to its account of legal ethics. I do not attempt to
elaborate an account of how agent's dispositions and commitments
ought to be tied to an impersonal moral analysis. Although L.A. Law
may begin many discussions, my response in this Essay is limited to
elaborating the claims of L.A. Law's soap opera frame. Using L.A.
Law in the classroom necessitates the analysis I present.
L.A. Law presents lawyers living well, living what our culture
conceives to be the "good life." Presenting lawyers whose lives are
recognizably rich, L.A. Law overcomes the public's hostility to law-
yers. L.A. Law's popularity, if not real lawyers' dissatisfaction with
their practices, suggests that an amoral role morality fails to satisfy
our culture's vision of living well. Regardless of the ethics of their
actions, L.A. Law lawyers have practices which enable their charac-
ters to be recognized. In our culture, as L.A. Law depicts, this is nec-
essary for living well, for living the good life.
It is not necessarily a defect of an account of ethical obligation
that the good lawyer does not live a good life. Ethical duties may
obligate one not to live well. But the goods of moral action are not
the only goods lawyers ought to be able to derive from their practices.
Living in the law ought to afford opportunities for realizing these
Professor Gillers has opined that " 'L.A. Law' is the single most important social vehicle in
America today for the presentation of the work lives of lawyers. Nothing else comes close to
presenting the ethical dilemmas lawyers face. People come to law school subliminally
influenced by 'L.A. Law.'" Machlowitz, Lawyers on TV, 74 A.B.A. J. 52, 55 (Nov. 1988).
9. T. NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 189 (1986). The (re)construction of ethics to
take into account agents' characters recently has been put into question. See C. GILLIGAN, IN
A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (in feminism and moral development); S. HAUERWAS, VISION
AND VIRTUE (1974) (in philosophy); A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981) (in philosophy);
T. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TopiCs (1985)
(in legal ethics); B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985) (in
philosophy).
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goods. Our culture's vision of the good life needs to be criticized.' 0
Yet, at least when ethical obligations are not thereby compromised,
cultural images of the good life provide them with reasons for restruc-
turing the professional role to enable better lives to be led in the law.
In presenting lawyers living seemingly desirable lives, L.A. Law
challenges the profession to justify legal practice's imposition of not
only ethical obligations but also constraints on the good life. "An
important, perhaps the most important task of political thought and
action is to arrange . . . the institutions under which we live" to
"make it possible for us to lead rich personal lives without denying
the impersonal claims" of ethics." I take L.A. Law seriously to pur-
sue this task by elaborating its depictions of lawyers living well.
12
L.A. Law is not realistic.'" Yet, I contend that it is descriptive of
our culture. Although not realistic, I assume that L.A. Law could not
succeed if it did not reflect how its audience sees itself or wishes it
were. I proceed to interpret L.A. Law, offering one account of its
success. My account is related to, but substantially different from, a
common interpretation of L.A. Law: L.A. Law's popularity is gener-
ated by its depiction of lawyers who are consumed by carnal and
material desires.' 4 L.A. Law does dwell on our culture's currencies of
the self: sex and money. L.A. Law, however, portrays lives no more
libertine than those depicted in other cultural products with a mass
following. And the salient fact in its portrayals of transactions in the
currencies of the self is that they are valued by the character of those
engaged in them.' 5
Lust and luxury do intrigue viewers, but they do not explain why
L.A. Law's depiction of legal practice is so popular with a public that
is hostile to the legal profession. Nor, given students' general cyni-
10. Cultural commitments present agents with reasons for acting, and the historical
project includes testing their contribution to the good life. T. NAGEL, supra note 9, at 186-88;
B. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 200-01; cf. M. WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL
CRITICISM (1987) (describing how criticism reflectively develops imminent social norms).
11. T. NAGEL, supra note 9, at 206-07.
12. L.A. Law would be irrelevant for this purpose if the legal practice it depicts cannot be
realized except in fiction. L.A. Law would be irrelevant if it is assumed that the subordination
of lawyer character is a functionally necessary component of the lawyer role, as does Pepper,
supra note 2, at 615. This assumption, however, needs to be proven. Normally, complex social
functions can be realized by a variety of social structures. Cf. A. GOULDNER, THE COMING
CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY 51 (1970) (functional analysis ought not to introduce the
autonomy of social structure as a domain assumption).
13. See infra notes 64-65.
14. See, Orey, Sex! Money! Glitz! In-House at L.A. Law, AM. LAW., Dec. 1988, at 32.
15. To take a rather trivial example, Arnold Becker (Corbin Bernsen), for all his riches
and women, is a lonely character. He stands as ready to foresake the pleasures of his latest
conquest as he is to seduce her.
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cism about the ethics of legal practice, does it explain why so many of
them empathize with the moral struggles depicted on L.A. Law.
In my reading, L.A. Law's success in no small part hinges on its
success as a soap opera. Its characters are admired because their
"characters" are privileged, capable of directing their actions and
being recognized by others. I argue that L.A. Law overcomes the
basis of public hostility to lawyers by depicting lawyers who do not
separate what they do from who they are. By portraying lawyers,
freed from material constraints, who face ethical dilemmas which
demand only the display of one's character, L.A. Law overcomes stu-
dent cynicism. In so doing, L.A. Law's portrayals are consonant
with, what I term, our culture's "privileging of character."
"Character" and its cognates are not readily defined, but they
bespeak a psychological, individualistic, and subjectivized account of
moral judgment. 6 By the privileging of character, I mean that the
motivations to express and be recognized by one's character are val-
ued. 17 The privileging of character emphasizes that agent-neutral rea-
sons-impersonal moral reasons-do not rule out reasons that derive
from the commitments of embodied characters, and that institutional
constraints on character demand ethical justification. In short, the
privileging of character defers the irony of Polonius' "To thine own
self be true."
To say that character is culturally privileged, of course, does not
16. As Professor Frug has noted, the word "character" has "overlapping literary,
psychological and sociological overtones" that make it difficult to define, but suit it well for
exploring the "interrelated tasks of self-definition and social definition [that] remain the critical
political and ethical issues for us." Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873,
876 (1988).
At a psychological level, character is one of those " 'things' that people 'have' on which
they 'base' their decisions." Id. at 873 (rejecting this definition for its static implications).
Valuing intentionalism accords with the privileging of this meaning of character.
At a social level, it is through "character" that we are recognized. As Professor Kronman
notes, one meaning of character is "those involvements and activities that ... make someone
the person he or she is and [not] those one merely has or does." Kronman, Living in the Law,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 840 (1987) (emphasis in original). Valuing individualism accords
with the privileging of this meaning of character.
At the normative level, character stresses the virtue and personal projects of the actor and
the relationship between integrity and responsibility. See supra note 9. A commitment to the
subjectivity of the moral agent accords with the privileging of this meaning of character.
Cf. M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 86-113 (1987) (reviewing
positive law's instantiation of commitments to individualism, intentionalism, and the
subjectivity of the moral agent).
17. The nature of this valuing is subject to both philosophical and cultural contention,
making this definition a weak one. Yet its weakness is deliberate, for the object of this Essay is
not to account for moral choice, but to explore how commitments to character affect our
concept of the professional role. Cf. P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE
4-5 (1969) (arguing for weak definitions and strong conceptual relations in social science).
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make it morally privileged. To say that agent-relative reasons are
predicates of moral judgment does not make them determinants of the
content of ethical judgment. The privileging of character may reflect a
conception of self in need of deconstruction"8 or the desiccation of
public spheres. '9 Confronting the privileging of character, however, is
necessary for two different reasons. For ethical pedagogy-for the
teaching of professional responsibility-addressing the privileging of
character allows entry into individual experiences of moral choice, in
which our shared ethical principles are crystallized. 2° For moral anal-
ysis-for determining how lawyers ought to live-addressing the
privileging of character allows discussion of how legal practice can
provide lawyers with access to the prerequisites' of the good life.
The privileging of character explains why "the old story" of law-
yers selling their scruples is still with us. Public unkindness to the
legal profession does not derive only from lawyers representing scoun-
drels. As L.A. Law suggests, in a culture which privileges character,
public ire is roused by the profession's claim that lawyers ought to be
judged by their conformity to professional rules, not by their
character.2'
L.A. Law also demonstrates why the debates about role-differen-
tiated ethics have been interminable. As others have recognized,
these debates fail to incorporate how "culture and tradition provide a
structure of goals and constraints" on legal practice.22 In a culture
whose conceptions of character are deeply rooted in individualism
23
and which idealizes professional status as granting to individuals
18. Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127, 184-85 n.96 (1984); see also
Frug, supra note 16, at 876 (rejecting an intentionalist definition of character for
mischaracterizing the provisional, creative, and revisionary nature of life). In exploring the
privileging of character, I do not seek to raise foundations, believing "[t]he transition is not
from illusion to ultimate truth, but from illusion to controlled doubt and irony." E. GELLNER,
THOUGHT AND CHANGE 81 (1964). Rather, I hope to suggest that character, like "progress,"
is one of those "nominally retained ideologies" that advance "the contemplation of those half-
implications and total exclusions, of those now-revealed ranges of possibilities." Id.
19. In a society without public spheres, concern with personal commitments and virtues
may replace attention to principles and rules, cutting off moral conversation. Diamond,
Losing Your Concepts, 98 ETHICS 255 (1988).
20. Cf Walzer, Teaching Morality, NEW REPUBLIC, June 10, 1978, at 12 (encouraging
study of morality and ethics).
21. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
22. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 981 n.74
(1987); see also Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984
Wis. L. REV. 1529, 1535-38.
23. R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 142-63 (1985) [hereinafter
R. BELLAH].
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autonomy in their work,24 an amoral professional morality betrays
socially sanctioned conceptions of the good life. Consequently, law-
yers have socially validated reasons to reject any formulation of an
amoral morality. For the resolution of these debates, as well as for
cynicism not to attend legal ethics, these reasons demand that law-
yers' access to the good life be justifiably limited.25
I had not intended to become an L.A. Law habitu6, but students
(and colleagues) pestered me with questions about the ethics of the
lawyers on L.A. Law. Reluctant to pass up these glimmers of interest
in my work, I introduced incidents from the television series as
hypotheticals for classroom discussion in my professional responsibil-
ity courses. This Essay is warranted by that experience; my reading
of L.A. Law interprets those conversations.
Surely L.A. Law has different types of plots and evokes different
responses. My reading centers on the soap opera aspects of L.A. Law
and one response which is typified in the following comment: "I
couldn't believe Anne took that case and did that. It's just not like
her."26 Of course, this response can be dismissed. One might retort,
"Anne is a junior partner; she'll take the cases that she is assigned."
Or, "If Anne were worthy of your admiration, she'd spend more time
worrying about what is in the client's interest, not what she could live
with." But these retorts do not "attend to the course of
conversation.
27
L.A. Law generates a moral discourse-which might be dis-
missed as gossip--that values Anne's will and seeks to evaluate
whether her will is good. Attending to such gossip, as the philosopher
argued two-hundred years ago, can cultivate and exercise moral com-
24. Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, 17 Soc. FORCES 457 (1939), reprinted in
T. PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34 (paperback rev. ed. 1964) (referring to
professionals in general); Kagan & Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985) (referring to lawyers).
25. This proposition may be restated without directly relying on the good life's constraint
on the moral life: Role-differentiated ethical rules cover only exceptional cases. A.
GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 20-33 (1980) (due to
requirements of consistency and universality). If the individual professional does not decide
which situations are exceptional, given commitments to individualism, the actor's sense of
responsibility will be undermined. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 79-81 (1980). If what is exceptional is publicly defined, given professional
autonomy, both ethical and unethical actions will be sustained. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on
Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985). Hence in a society committed to individualism
and professional autonomy, an amoral professional morality will be either untenable (Postema)
or indeterminate (Rhode). To foster responsibility and limit unscrupulous actions, constraints
on lawyer motivations need to be justified.
26. Referring to Anne Kelsey (portrayed by Jill Eikenberry).
27. I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 157 (L. Beck trans. 1956).
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mitments.2 Although this gossip must be scrutinized, its inclusion in
moral pedagogy provides an alternative to the cynicism in which
" '[Honesty] is praised and starves.' "29 Students who display cyni-
cism about their own ethical interests, suprisingly admire the will of
L.A. Law lawyers to display their character. Cultivating the moral
worth of this admiration is a challenge posed by L.A. Law.
The following three Sections move from pedagogy to moral anal-
ysis. In Section II, I consider the strip-mining of L.A. Law for teach-
ing-hypotheticals. Using the teaching of Kuzak's "first case" as an
example, I describe the cost of reducing Kuzak to a mask, without an
identity.3" Strip-mining L.A. Law for hypotheticals, I conclude,
neither captures L.A. Law's enhancement of interest in questions of
legal ethics nor its conception of moral dilemmas.
I elaborate L.A. Law's genre, the soap opera, in Section III to
explore L.A. Law's conception of moral dilemmas L.A. Law's
privileging of character reflects the soap opera's frame on moral
dilemmas. Beginning with the soap opera frame, I return to Kuzak
and his ethics. Instead of his compliance with the ethics rules, at issue
in this Section is the worth of Kuzak's character. By first elaborating
and then criticizing Kuzak's character, I explore L.A. Law's account
of legal ethics. I emphasize that Kuzak assumes responsibility for
actions under soap opera conditions. It is the absence of these condi-
tions in everyday life that suggests why the "old stories" are still with
US.
Finally, in Section IV, I return to the popularity of L.A. Law. Its
popularity emphasizes that the privileging of character does not lead
to ambivalence. Although "we are actually simultaneously drawn"'"
to contradictory descriptions of action, I conclude that L.A. Law's
popularity speaks of our culture's commitments to designing insitu-
tions in which a lawyer's character counts.
As an account of a (fictive) lawyer's ethics, this Essay addresses
one confrontation between character and an ethic of rules. As criti-
cism of one public imagining of lawyers, this Essay claims and con-
fronts our culture's privileging of character, at least for professionals
like lawyers. As a report on teaching professional responsibility, this
Essay prizes students speaking as if they have emerged not from a
28. Id. at 157-65 ("Storytelling" and "jesting," not moral theory, are the bases for "the
method of founding and cultivating genuine moral dispositions.").
29. Id. at 164 (citations omitted).
30. Cf. J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 27-28 (1976). Noonan recognizes
that masks are an often dysfunctional fiction. Id. at 26 ("At the point of a legal system where
it is too much to recognize that a human being exists, a mask is employed.").
31. M. KELMAN, supra note 16, at 87 (emphasis in original).
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bath of cynical acid, but one with ethical soap.3 2
II. STRIP MINING L.A. LA W FOR HYPOTHETICALS: MASKS
WITHOUT IDENTITIES
L.A. Law often tells tales of lawyer morality. In previous televi-
sion series, lawyers were aligned with their clients and their clients
were almost always innocent. Consequently, difficult questions of
legal ethics rarely were implicated. Because clients were innocent and
justice always prevailed, there was little occasion to question the
assumptions or test the limits of the "[a]dversary [s]ystem [e]xcuse." 33
If ethical problems arose, they normally related to issues of compe-
tency and diligence. They engaged viewers in the question, "Will the
lawyer, this time, have the skill to protect his virtuous client?"34 L.A.
32. The most sophisticated debate on the content of professional responsibility courses,
that between Professors Chemerinsky and Schneyer, appears to turn on the relative
contributions of agent-relative reasons and an impersonal moral standpoint to moral judgment.
Chemerinsky, Pedagogy Without Purpose: An Essay on Professional Responsibility Courses and
Casebooks, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 189; Chemerinsky, Training the Ethical Lawyer: A
Rejoinder to Schneyer, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 959; Schneyer, Professional Responsibility
Casebooks and the New Positivism: A Reply to Professor Chemerinsky, 1985 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 943. Professor Chemerinsky argued that to motivate ethical behavior, professional
responsibility courses should focus on students' "personal morality," "encouraging . . .
independent moral judgment." Chemerinsky, Training the Ethical Lawyer, supra, at 962
(emphasis added). Professor Schneyer argued that professional responsibility courses ought to
emphasize the rules, teaching that the "rules and moral judgment must and usually can be
made to correspond." Schneyer, supra, at 957 (emphasis in original In evaluating L.A. Law's
introduction into a professional responsibility course, I suggest one resolution for this debate.
First, introducing L.A. Law indicates the point where the positions overlap: As empathy with
L.A. Law characters demonstrate, the moral motive can be experienced. Second, agent-relative
reasons can be criticized by a depersonalized moral analysis. See supra note 10; infra text
accompanying notes 52-57 (criticizing Kuzak's character). Third, rules can be criticized from
an agent-relative position. At the least, moral duties do not always override shared
conceptions of the prerequisites of the good life. See T. NAGEL, supra note 9, at 196-97; infra
text accompanying notes 65-84 (consequences of the privileging of character).
33. Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83 (D. Luban ed. 1984)
(discussing conflicts between professional morality and ethical obligation inherent in the
adversary system).
34. Although viewers could rely on an affirmative answer to this question, dramatic
tension was sustained by the complications of discovery and litigation. On these series, the
lawyer's ethical worth was determined by whether his skill unravelled the truth to protect his
client before the program ended. These series suggested that truth would emerge from the
adversary system, but only if the lawyer was highly competent and diligent. Consequently, a
lawyer on these series could smile with confidence and purpose, as Perry Mason so often did,
when clients, protesting their innocence, rejected the plea bargains the lawyer had negotiated.
Of course, much more could be said about the messages these lawyer series projected.
One might analyze their valuation of individuality, competency, or privacy. Or one might
analyze what they did not teach, e.g., the duties of loyalty when defending the abhorrent or
guilty client. Their class, sex, and political biases are discussed in Stark, Perry Mason Meets
Sonny Crockett: The History of Lawyers and the Police as Television Heroes, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 229 (1987).
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Law, on the other hand, tests more than the lawyers' skills in investi-
gation and litigation; it tests their commitments to themselves, their
clients, and to the adversary system. In an innovation for television,
L.A. Law depicts lawyers in conflict with compromised and compro-
mising clients.
Extracting these conflicts from the series and presenting them as
hypotheticals in a professional responsibility course appears desirable
for at least three reasons. First, using L.A. Law hypotheticals capital-
izes on student interest in the series, stimulating classroom discussion.
Second, instead of discussing yet another judicial opinion, using
hypotheticals drawn from L.A. Law introduces variety into the class-
room, perhaps arousing the previously unengaged. Third, hypotheti-
cals from L.A. Law promote discussion and self-reflection about the
affective aspects of lawyering.
L.A. Law's dramatization of how lawyers feel when placed in
ethical dilemmas can stimulate discussion that is not readily gener-
ated by case reports. Case reports are not very effective materials for
conveying the affective life of lawyering.3 5 Yet professional responsi-
bility courses need to discuss lawyers' emotional responses to their
work for at least four reasons. First, a lawyer's feelings may influence
her actions, particularly discretionary judgments, such as permissive
disclosures. Second, lawyers ought to learn to live and to deal con-
structively with the feelings generated by practice.36 Third, some of
the virtues of exemplary lawyers can be developed best through the
process of empathetic identification. 7 Finally, lawyers can choose a
career recognizing that differing practice specialties, settings, and
organizations elicit and damp different feelings. Thus even teachers
who have no need to engage greater attention from their students
35. R. CRAMTON, AUDIOVISUAL MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Vii
(1987).
36. One purpose of law school education in professional responsibility is to provide future
lawyers with a safe harbor in which to discuss their fears and anxieties. Professional
responsibility classes, like law schools, all too often fail to convince students that they are safe
harbors. Then, introducing fictional materials into the classroom can assist students to air, at
least partially, their fears and anxieties. As Dean Cramton suggests, discussing fictive
surrogates can spare students "embarrassment or undue self-revelation." Id. at viii.
37. One way in which we come both to understand and to value a virtue we don't fully
possess is by empathetic identification with those who better possess the virtue. We learn, for
example, about integrity by empathetic identification with displays of pride and humility by
those who possess integrity. More generally, we interpret, in part, to look for ourselves. In
this way, thick description becomes a moral resource. C. GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward
an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-6 (1973); cf P.
ROTH, ZUCKERMAN BOUND (1985) (describing a character who is neurotically fixated on this
interpretive motive).
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might benefit by mining L.A. Law for hypotheticals, extracting both
the conflicts and the emotional responses depicted.
In order to exemplify law school use of this television series, con-
sider Kuzak's "first case," depicted on L.A. Law's premiere episode.
Michael Kuzak (portrayed by Harry Hamlin) is a handsome ex-dis-
trict attorney. He represents a client who is factually guilty. The cli-
ent, a spoiled brat, is accused of raping and beating a defenseless
leukemia victim. Kuzak is forced to suffer the brat because the
client's father is an important business client of the firm. During the
preliminary hearing, the victim is subjected to a humiliating cross-
examination by the appointed counsel of a co-defendant. Rather than
admiring the lawyer's skill, Kuzak questions his own commitments.
Later, Kuzak tells the victim that he wouldn't lose sleep if she got a
gun and blew his client away. The victim replies: "That's the differ-
ence between us, I would."
Kuzak's ill will toward his client is concretized when the client,
armed, extorts Kuzak in an empty parking garage. Kuzak then seeks
out a police acquaintance and inquires as to whether his client is
licensed to carry a gun. As a result of this communication, the client
is stopped and drugs are found on him. Kuzak pleads his client to
eighteen months, thinking that jail-time would do the spoiled brat
some good. KUzak's first case has come to what he feels is a success-
ful conclusion. We later see Kuzak being reprimanded by his senior
partner. But looks are deceiving. The senior partner relents: "I
might argue with your ethics in this case. But I admire your con-
science." The show ends with the victim and Kuzak embracing.
Kuzak's first case might be introduced into a law school class-
room to discuss the interplay between the ethical rules on confidenti-
ality, conflict of interest, and withdrawal." Other obvious issues for
discussion include the harassing cross-examination, Kuzak's indepen-
dence from the influence of the client's father, the priority of means
over ends, and a comparison and analysis of the public defender's and
the private attorney's actions. On the other hand, Kuzak's feelings
might be discussed. Affective issues can be elicited from this case.
How should Kuzak deal with his prosecutorial habits of the heart
now that he is a defense attorney? Can Kuzak represent with zeal a
client he hates or fears? What ought to be Kuzak's reactions on see-
ing his client taken to jail? What should be Kuzak's attitude towards
38. The cut-aways of the program highlight questions such as: Was'it improper to ask the
policeman whether his client was licensed to carry a gun? Does Kuzak have a duty to inform
his client of his conversation with the policeman? May Kuzak continue the represention if he
discloses to his client his conversation with the policeman?
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the victim? How should Kuzak deal with his doubts? How should
Kuzak feel about being "forced" by the firm to take this case? How
can you convey to your client that your loyalty to him is not compro-
mised by declining to represent his son?
In my professional responsibility course, I used Kuzak's first case
to raise these questions with seeming success. But as I used more L.A.
Law hypotheticals, I discovered significant limitations. Students
would continue to add: "Maybe that would have been the right thing
to do, but Kuzak couldn't, and maybe shouldn't, have done that."
Many of my students, I found, liked to hypothesize about what the
series did not portray-what happened during the commercials, so to
speak- but only to discuss what alternatives actually were available
to Kuzak. The students seemed to lose interest when I posed
hypotheticals with facts different from, not additional to, those
depicted on L.A. Law. Students were not that interested in discussing
how Kuzak should have felt, even though they loved imagining how
other L.A. Law characters such as Arnie or Anne would have handled
the brat.
As a solution to the problem of jaded, bored students, L.A. Law's
success is limited. As long as students are captivated by L.A. Law,
they will want to gossip about and rework the problems that face the
lawyers of McKenzie, Brackman, Chaney & Kuzak. But students
know the difference between analyzing incidents depicted on L.A.
Law and analyzing abstract hypotheticals whose masks are named
Brackman, Kuzak and Kelsey, not Able, Baker and Carr. Enhanced
student interest is dissipating capital when the series is used only to
launch a discussion that departs from their interest in it. And why
not? Students need to be offered more than bait.
As a vehicle for discussing the affective life of lawyering, L.A.
Law hypotheticals demonstrate the difficulty of conveying the motive
and dictates of legal ethics, given the other frames for psychological
and moral analyses students possess. Like Kuzak's senior partner,
some students admire Kuzak's dispositions and actions, even when
they agree that continued representation violated valid ethical rules.
Beyond disagreements about what the client deserved or what client
loyalty demands, others agree there is moral worth in Kuzak's display
of his "conscience."
Regardless of their understanding of the ethical rules, many stu-
dents continue to value gossiping about the character of Michael
Kuzak. They've seen other characters such as Anne and Abby learn
how to play the professional game, but they value those moments
when these fictive lawyers display their "real" selves. They reject
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hypotheticals that are not "true" to the character. They object to my
using L.A. Law lawyers as masks, mere place-holders, in hypotheti-
cals. More important, they suggest that stripping the characters of
their identities alters the moral problem.
Attending to their conversation, I realized that, like me, many of
my students were soap opera fans. In order to avoid having legal
ethics praised but foresaken in practice, I began to discuss the soap
opera genre. We discussed not just the hypothetical, but the manner
in which L.A. Law frames the ethical dilemmas. I found that the stu-
dents could better articulate their ethical concerns and convictions
when I did not simply strip-mine L.A. Law for hypotheticals, but also
discussed the lives of soap opera characters.
This result is not surprising. In principle, two problems are
raised by the use of nonlegal material in legal education. First, if
some nonlegal material explains the law, how do we know when our
search outside the case ought to be discontinued? The introduction of
such material threatens to lead us into a bacchanalian whirl, seeking
truth in ever greater contextuality. For this reason, when we use such
material, we often rely on the material to prove a particular point,
side-stepping any question of its own interpretability. Second, besides
presenting the issues we deem relevant, nonlegal material often
presents its own explanations. Nonlegal material makes relevant con-
nections that lawyers are trained to filter. For this reason, we often
strip-mine the material, seeking to sever the issue in which we are
interested from the connections suggested by the material.
Introducing L.A. Law episodes raises each of these problems.
First, class discussion is threatened by students bringing fact after fact
from the series into the discussion. The firm of McKenzie, Brack-
man, Chaney & Kuzak comes to assume a verisimilitude it doesn't
possess. Second, generating hypotheticals from L.A. Law introduces
the interpretations and connections that are relevant to the actors on
the series. By strip-mining L.A. Law, I sought to avoid these
problems. But I found that, for at least some students, the decisions
and actions portrayed on L.A. Law assume a certainty that challenges
redescription.
Both of these problems associated with the use of nonlegal
materials can be offset by addressing how the materials are themselves
framed. Recognizing that the materials are framed interrupts the
search for contextuality. Analyzing their frame questions the connec-
tions suggested by the material and allows discussion of what is or is
not relevant. Understanding L.A. Law by its frame presents and
holds in question its depiction of moral dilemmas.
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To abstract a judicial judgment from the frame in which it
appears risks misreading. Understanding how judicial opinions frame
facts and policy is necessary to comprehending fully the questions the
court addresses and purports to answer. In order to criticize what
judges have written or failed to write, however, we must first learn the
craft and limits of the genre of opinion-writing.3 9
In order to comprehend the judgments depicted in noncase mate-
rial, genre criticism is needed. Like cases, such materials have been
framed partly by the genre from which they are drawn. We risk mis-
reading the material and losing or misleading students when we intro-
duce material-be it cases, current events, or artistic renderings-and
abstract the information contained in them from the frame in which
they appear.4 °
In strip-mining L.A. Law for hypotheticals, I abstracted the
material from its frame. In so doing, I lost not only many of my
students, but also an educational opportunity. In order to claim this
opportunity, as discussed in the next Section, I considered how the
39. Today, as yesterday, regardless of our political opinions, law school education is an
"impious treatment of cases," as David Riesman observed in 1947. D. RIESMAN, Toward an
Anthropological Science of Law and the Legal Profession, in INDIVIDUALISM RECONSIDERED
440, 442 (1954). Two recent treatments of the opinion genre are Jaff, Frame-Shifting: An
Empowering Methodology for Teaching and Learning Legal Reasoning, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC.
249 (1986) and Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 U. VA. L. REV. 915 (1988).
40. This claim should be uncontroversial at least with respect to work that makes some
claim to art. Art is not merely data. Art, high or low, may mislead if the audience forgets the
art, reducing it to propaganda or positivistic description. For a discussion of the
propagandistic reductions (and one form of genre analysis), see N. FRYE, ANATOMY OF
CRITICISM 5 (1957) ("The artist, as John Stuart Mill saw in a wonderful flash of critical
insight, is not heard but overheard."). For a description of the positivistic reduction, see
Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and
Spectator Sports, 21 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 185, 197 (1987). While I agree with Macaulay that
"film and TV offer entertainment and not social science," I do not conclude that "[v]iewers
who rely only on these reports for information are badly misled." Id. at 197 (citations
omitted). Art, even if not positivistically warranted, can be informative. The general problems
of uncritical acceptance are compounded with art because there is no neutral artistic realism.
All art, not just painting, wears a frame. But analysis of the framing can produce information.
Macaulay apparently believes that viewers supply their own frames: "Just as a Rorschach ink
blot, audiences can interpret films such as this in many ways." Id. at 201. Assuredly, there
may be many interpretations of films, but unlike those imposed on an ink blot, not just any one
will do.
This claim at first may appear more controversial with respect to reports of current
events. But as the students of the language of politics and journalism assure us, because these
frames are unreflectively engrained, their analysis is even more important pedagogically. See
C. MUELLER, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNICATION 11-12 (1973); M. SCHUDSON,
DISCOVERING THE NEWS 7-10 (1978); see also M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF
POLITICS 14 (1985) (unreflective responses to framed political events results in "greater
susceptibility to manipulation by others").
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dilemmas of legal practice are framed by L.A. Law and its genre, the
soap opera.
III. L.A. LA w AS A SOAP OPERA: PRIVILEGED CHARACTERS
FREED FROM CIRCUMSTANCE
The creators of L.A. Law chose to make it a lawyer soap opera.4
Its form emphasizes interweaving plots, suspended action, and cut-
aways at moments of moral choice. It invites us to gossip; it invites us
to predict the characters' perceptions and judgments. A soap opera
typically cuts away at the moment that Bill learns that Jean is carry-
ing John's baby (leading and leaving the audience to gauge Bill's reac-
tion, his alternatives for action, Jean's perfidy, John's complicity, and
the effects of these events on their community). So too, L.A. Law cuts
away at the moment Anne learns that her client has lied to her (lead-
41. At least three other television genres were available to the series' creators. First, they
could have created a who-dun-it built around a law firm's case-load. This genre has been done
and has its drawbacks. Series about detectives, public or private, I suspect, are superior to
lawyer series as who-dun-it vehicles. Raymond Burr, for example, had greater scope to
investigate crime and get caught up in the conflict of clues as the physically handicapped
Police Chief Ironsides than he did as the legally constrained Perry Mason.
Second, Bochco and Fisher could have created a lawyer procedural. Detective novels fall
into two classes: who-dun-its and police procedurals. Bochco's Hill Street Blues was a TV
police procedural. It avoided engaging the viewer in the solution of crimes. Hill Street
directed attention away from the bust to what cops do besides finding the tell-tale clue, chasing
the bad guys, and cornering them for the arrest. It involved the viewer in police practice,
especially its grit and dirt. Its scripts emulated the style not of Agatha Christie, but of Ed
McBain.
A lawyer procedural is a desirable genre because the public has little understanding of
what lawyers actually do. Our society is inundated by laws and litigation, but the average
citizen is legally illiterate. By depicting the variety of law jobs, a lawyer procedural could
teach the public that the legal system does more than set up boundaries, generating disputes.
In its depiction of legal work, however, L.A. Law is common. On Perry Mason, too, you would
have seen the adversarial disputes, tearful requests for help, forlorn confessions, tense
negotiations, and courtroom dramatics that you see on L.A. Law. The fact that L.A. Law is
not a lawyer procedural, however, does not mean that it cannot be instructive about legal
ethics. Frames need not be realistic to be informative. See supra note 40.
Third, Bochco and Fisher could have created a topical lawyer drama, perhaps modelled
after Lou Grant or Quincy. They might have created a series, like The Defenders, about public-
interested lawyers, each week investigating a public issue, daring some but not much
controversy.
A topical lawyer drama is a desirable genre because the legal profession is one in which
the brilliance and moral commitment of some of its practitioners is little known. A bridge
designed by an average engineer lasts for decades and is crossed and appreciated by many. But
a brief by a first-rate lawyer is ephemeral; it is read and appreciated by only a few, even when it
makes new law affecting many. My prideful heart longed for a show like Quincy, depicting an
exceptionally skilled lawyer who possesses integrity and devotion to professional principles,
exposing corruption and foul play, and teaching that, although the lawyer's work is sometimes
dirty, it benefits us all. But I would have been content with the moral ambivalence of Hill
Street.
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ing and leaving the audience to gauge Anne's reaction, her alterna-
tives for action, her client's perfidy, her own complicity, and the
community's resources to control the consequences).
Soap operas imagine a set of relatively complex characters and
place them in incidents of conflict and moral choice. 42  In their
responses to these conflicts, the characters display their "character.
'4
The morals of the characters govern their actions. Soap operas ask
that we judge their characters. As David Thorburn explains, this is
why they are called soap "operas":4
No one goes to Italian opera expecting a realistic plot, and since
applause for the important arias is an inflexible convention, no one
expects such works to proceed without interruption. The pleasures
of this kind of opera are largely (though not exclusively) the
pleasures of the brilliant individual performance, and good operas
in this tradition are those in which the composer has contrived
roles which test as fully as possible the vocal capacities of the
42. This formulation says nothing about the nature of the incidents in which characters
are placed. In much of its material, L.A. Law resembles other soap operas. On prime-time
soap operas, the formula stories depict those problems, especially sexual ones, that confront
groups of rich, sophisticated individuals.
L.A. Law has plenty of this material. L.A. Law also tells the same basic-type of lawyer
and legal stories as the day-time soap operas, with more depth and greater plausibility. On the
day-time soap operas, legal practice is depicted as bubbling with soap material. Even more
than business, law provides opportunities for manipulation, for characters who grow rich off
others' ills, and for dramatic tension concerning whether a character is a hero, saving the
needy, or a trickster, terrorizing the innocent. Cf. Mindes & Acock, Trickster, Hero, Helper:
A Report on the Lawyer Image, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 177 (describing varying
perceptions of lawyers as tricksters, heroes, and helpers). For this reason, lawyers populate the
daytime soap operas. On Guiding Light, for example, Mike Bauer, Ross Marler and Derek
Colby all are lawyers. From them, we learn the consequences of being a suspect or being
found guilty of fraud. About them, we wonder: Will they be manipulative? How? And, with
what consequences? Similarly, L.A. Law lawyers also describe others' problems, and we await
the consequences of their practices.
Day-time television also is populated by a series of courtroom dramas in which the only
continuing character is the judge, the personification of the law. (e.g. The three "court" shows:
Superior Court, Divorce Court, and People's Court). The method of these shows may be
illustrated by an episode of The Judge: Pick a story with soap opera material, like a woman
falling in love with her fianc6's brother. Insert a legal controversy: A breach of promise
action. Have the testimony relate the story, often developing the tale by the telling: The
fianc6's brother reveals the illicit love on the stand. Leave the final resolution to the judge:
The judge berates the henpecking mother, depicted as responsible for this mess. Often neither
artful nor plausible, these shows convey the law in its most paternal image. L.A. Law is much
more nuanced, though it also uses such soap material-for example, Kuzak's first case is the
story of the spoiled little rich kid who nobody could discipline. It is in the quality of its.drama
and the introduction of incidents dramatizing lawyers' ethics that make L.A. Law plots
distinctive.
43. See supra note 16 (meanings of "character").
44. Thorburn, Television Melodrama, in UNDERSTANDING TELEVISION: ESSAYS ON
TELEVISION AS A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FORCE 73, 79 (R. Adler ed. 1981).
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performers.45
On television soap operas, moral capacities, not vocal capacities are
tested.
All of us fight every day against the force of circumstance-the
compulsions of fortune and necessity, the webs of the Greek god-
desses Tyche and Ananke. Sometimes, perhaps often, we retreat or
compromise. The situation defines us, not the reverse. Unlike most
of us, characters on soap operas live in a realm in which social forces
do not prevent the display of their character. For example, Dallas '46
characters largely are free from the demands the rest of us face in
bureaucratic organizations and organized social settings. In real life,
even wheeler-dealer oilmen are more constrained by the force of cir-
cumstance than are the Ewings. On soap operas, life's ills--e.g.,
divorce and unemployment-are merely occasions for character
expression. On soap operas, actors are depicted "hurtling through
time warps of social convention with no aerodynamic drag."
47
Like all soap opera characters, the lawyers on L.A. Law acknowl-
edge their responsibility and make their decisions on the basis of their
characters. On L.A. Law, neither the client's morals nor the demands
of the lawyer's work determine how a lawyer will act. L.A. Law
depicts lawyers fighting victoriously to preserve their characters
against that tricky nemesis, the force of circumstance. Arnie and
Mike-just like Dallas characters J.R. and Bobby-Ldisplay their dif-
ferent characters in the different personal and work choices they
make. In resolving the conflicts caused by clients and friends, each
lawyer is true to his own character.4" Viewed within the frame of its
genre, L.A. Law asks that the characters of its lawyers be judged.
Framed by the soap genre, Kuzak's first case depicts him as seek-
ing to reveal and to preserve his character against the brat's
onslaughts and the dictates of his role. Freed from the force of cir-
cumstance, he acts according to character. He asks and receives from
the senior partner admiration for his conscience.
Why did L.A. Law choose this frame? You've heard the joke:
"How can you tell whether that run-over thing in the middle of the
road was a skunk or a lawyer? There are skid marks by the skunk."
45. Id.
46. Dallas (CBS weekly television series) (depicting the life experiences of the Ewing
family, wealthy owners of a successful oil company).
47. Arlen, Smooth Pebbles at Southfork, in UNDERSTANDING TELEVISION: ESSAYS ON
TELEVISION AS A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FORCE, supra note 44, at 173, 179 (discussing the
heroine of the mini-series Scruples).
48. Cf. Machlowitz, supra note 8, at 54 (L.A. Law lawyers "don't give a damn about what
anybody else thinks, not even their bosses.").
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Given public hostility toward lawyers, how could the series' creators
have hoped to gain an audience? Would anyone but lawyers or law-
yers-to-be tune into a series that portrayed the legal profession sympa-
thetically? For a series to have legs, a mass public must empathize
with its characters. Given public attitudes towards lawyers, how do
you construct a series whose central characters are all lawyers?
L.A. Law's producers apparently did not accept that public hos-
tility towards the legal profession rests on a confusion.49 Instead, they
seem to have decided that public hostility stems from the fact that
lawyers make moral choices but appear to sidestep responsibility,
denying that they ought to be evaluated by the standards used for
other characters. Public ire is raised when lawyers are perceived to
deny that they are making choices or that they can be held accounta-
ble for their choices." To the public, the lawyer seems to say: "Don't
49. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7. One of the series' co-creators, Terry Louise
Fisher, explained their premise as follows: "These aren't sanitized 'TV lawyers.' Their clients
aren't always innocent, their tactics aren't always nice, the issues are never black and white."
Monahan, Who Puts the Law into "L.A. Law? " 15 BARRISTER 8, 10 (1988).
50. According to this interpretation, it is not that lawyers act in special ways that angers
the public. The public knows that different situations require different actions. Public hostility
derives from lawyers' apparent denial of responsibility for their choices. If this is true, then the
Bar's public relations efforts must be substantive to succeed. They must convince the public
that the requirements of legal ethics are responsible ones. Public hostility to lawyers will be
lessened only when citizens are convinced that in lawyers' shoes they would act as lawyers are
directed to act.
The public is not convinced. The public sees lawyers denying that their characters
influence their actions, even when their characters are good ones. I find support for this view
in Robert C. Post's admirable collection of cultural imaginings of lawyers. Post, On the
Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CAL. L. REV. 379 (1987). His
article demonstrates that, when lawyers are heroically depicted, it is because they display their
character: Ronald Colman in The Talk of the Town must first "fall in love" before he becomes
heroic. Id. at 381. In Winston Churchill's A Far Country, the lawyer becomes heroic as he
"acquires a social and moral conscience." Id. In The Man who Shot Liberty Valence, Jimmy
Stewart's heroism emerges when he is "[p]ushed beyond endurance" into himself. Id. at 382.
Conversely, when lawyers are condemned, they don't display their character. Dryden's
Asebia, for example, only had to bribe " 'the Lawyer's Tongue,'" not the Lawyer. Id. at 385
(quoting J. DRYDEN, ALBION AND ALBANIUS: AN OPERA 23 (1691)).
Post offers a different explanation for public attitudes. He argues that lawyers aren't
praised for acting on the basis of their character, but for their finding "a spontaneous, coherent
system of values." Id. at 385. When lawyers find themselves, according to Post, they find the
immanent law. This explanation, however, forgets that our culture is individualistic. Post is
wrong to suggest that when our "manner" offers a " 'logic that is unanswerable, that gives no
opportunity to any sane mind ... to refuse the unqualified assent of conviction absolute,' " we
have been socially responsible. Id. at 384 (quoting D. PHILLIPS, THE FASHIONABLE
ADVENTURES OF JOSHUA CRAIG 75 (1909)).
We only know we have done what we have to do. If we have become herdic, it is because,
like the lawyers portrayed by Ronald Colman and Jimmy Stewart, we have stood alone in our
moments of trial. For us,
"the myth says you can be a truly good person, worthy of admiration and love,
only if you resist fully joining the group .... The cowboy, like the detective, can
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blame me if the work I've performed, or the client -I've helped, ends
up hurting you." In the situation most salient to the public, the insti-
tutional justification for why good men act as did the lawyer is at its
weakest. The lawyer then can readily be perceived as saying: "Don't
blame me. I'm not responsible if my client goes free and kills a dozen
people." Lawyers seem to an estranged public to claim that their
work and their character are separate.5 '
L.A. Law overcomes the basis of public hostility to lawyers by
adopting a soap opera format and depicting lawyers who do not sepa-
rate what they do from who they are. L.A. Law lawyers do not con-
form to the public's image of lawyers. They rarely claim their actions
are forced by their job requirements. Even when they do make such
claims, they, and we, know they are lying. Ethical rules are tested by
their characters and are complied with only when they meet that test.
L.A. Law both depicts and resolves these conflicts as in a soap opera:
Character, not role or circumstance, determines action.
The lawyers of McKenzie, Brackman, Chaney & Kuzak are not
just mouthpieces, hired guns, or amoral manipulators. On L.A. Law,
lawyers with different characters make different decisions, and they
accept responsibility for moral choices in every aspect of their prac-
tice: the clients they choose to represent, their relations with clients,
their attitudes towards staff, and how they handle the choice between
family and career. L.A. Law's reception demonstrates that the public
can empathize with lawyers whose actions reveal their character.
What Kuzak should have done in his first case is put in issue by
L.A. Law's frame in two distinct senses. First, did Kuzak act on the
basis of his character? And, if so, what is the moral worth of Kuzak's
character? Treating Kuzak as a place-holder in a hypothetical mis-
be valuable to society only because he is a completely autonomous individual
who stands outside it. To serve society, one must be able to stand alone, not
needing others, not depending on their judgment, and not submitting to their
wishes .... A good society thus depends in the last analysis on the goodness of
individuals, not on the soundness of institutions or the fairness of laws."
R. BELLAH, supra note 23, at 145-46, 183. The lawyer-heroes Post describes have not found
the immanent law; they have found their mythic individuality.
51. Admittedly, this separation also is sometimes demanded by clients. This is explained
by the disjunction between individual and collective instrumental rationality. When lawyers
represent us individually, we may want this separation. Then, we want them to be hired guns.
But when they represent others, we want them to exercise their character and to act
responsibly. For example, if we were injured by a doctor, we would want a lawyer to bring a
medical malpractice suit. But when the lawyer is representing someone else, we complain that
lawyers bring too many frivolous suits, driving up malpractice rates and medical costs. The
disjunction between individual and collective instrumental rationality, in part, explains why
lawyers "are simultaneously praised and blamed for the very same actions." Post, supra note
50, at 380.
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takes the moral questions framed by this television soap opera. L.A.
Law asks that we judge Kuzak's legal ethics by the standard used for
all soap opera characters: What manner of man is Michael Kuzak?
Do we want to be like him?
By the time we meet Kuzak, he has demonstrated that he can
play big-league law. He is a successful law firm partner and has
reached a stage in his life at which he wants his victories to reveal
something about his character, not just his talents at manipulating the
system and winning its games. He wants to be secure that he is part
of the elect. According to Victor Cifuentes (Jimmy Smits), whom he
hired as an associate, Kuzak is "tired of picking up the snails himself
and wants to bring in a Mexican gardener." Kuzak now imagines
himself involved in something higher than a game.12 In a classic pat-
tern, Kuzak needs to be able to view his success as a just outcome and
not merely the way the dice fell. Do we want to be like him?
Kuzak's character can be judged by his personal choices, not
only by his handling of legal cases. L.A. Law suggests that we can
gain insight into the ethics of legal practice indirectly. If we want to
peer into legal ethibs, it tells us, we first must peer into personal eth-
ics.53 We judge Kuzak as a lawyer by judging him first as a person.
What do we know of Kuzak's character from his personal inter-
actions? One thing we cannot forget about Kuzak is that he dressed
in a gorilla suit, appeared uninvited at a wedding, and dragged off the
bride. 4 How many of us know and like that type of guy? Once we
answer that question, L.A. Law suggests, we can judge his morals as a
lawyer.
Michael Kuzak's character initially was revealed on L.A. Law
primarily through his pursuit of Grace Van Owen (Susan Dey). He
52. One also might consider Kuzak in another case. Kuzak is representing a fired TV
anchorwoman who lies to Kuzak about her reasons for turning down a settlement offer.
Kuzak does not discover the lie until after the jury renders a verdict. Kuzak feels used by his
client, even though we know a client has the right to reject a settlement offer for any reason
(except primarily to harrass or delay). Kuzak's girlfriend, Grace Van Owen, does not
understand his feelings. "She used you for her journalistic kicks and you used her for your
lawyer kicks," she says, "You used each other." Unlike Kuzak's senior partner, Grace sees
Kuzak as playing a game, not as giving voice to his conscience. Grace doesn't understand
Kuzak. She doesn't know that he wants his cases to be representations of his character.
53. This does not mean that lawyers in court need act like parishioners in church. The
soap opera genre does not mean that L.A. Law lawyers necessarily will reject the actions
required by a role-differentiated morality. Soap operas continually present the moral texture,
for example, of confidentiality. Viewers of soap operas often are left to judge whether certain
circumstances require a confidence to be held or betrayed.
54. I leave it to other culture critics to compare Bochco and Fisher's depiction of an
interrupted wedding to the depiction of an interrupted wedding in Mike Nichols' The
Graduate.
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falls in love within moments of first seeing her. Kuzak tells a col-
league, who responds: "Take a number." But Kuzak does not believe
his passion is common; he sets out to win Grace, who happens to be
engaged to another.
In his pursuit, Kuzak does not play by the rules of courtship.
When a woman repeatedly says she really does not want to be called
again, many men would get the hint. Not Michael Kuzak. He does
not bow out gracefully. He hounds the object of his passion, striving
to realize what to him is right. He trusts his judgments and passions
more than he does the actions of others. He is not deterred by
Grace's decision to go through with the wedding. Dressed in a gorilla
suit, he breaks up her ceremony.
Kuzak understands passion as involving games. He is such an
addicted games-player that he has added a basketball hoop to his
office wastebasket. But he does not play all his games by the rules.
We learn from his handling of the moral dilemmas of courtship and
legal practice, that rules-like taking "no" for an answer or the pre-
sumption of innocence--can be set aside or broken when they get in
the way of Kuzak's passions.
If Kuzak broke the game's rules because he did not want to lose,
he would be immoral. But Kuzak is more difficult to judge. Kuzak is
no philosopher or moral paragon: He breaks the rules to serve his
passions, which all too often he equates with the good. In one sense,
he is not a "pro" because he takes his games personally. He wants his
actions to reflect the rule of his heart.
In his relation with Grace, we know how to test the outcome of
passionate involvement. Courtship is justly won not by rule-obser-
vance, but by love. To tell Kuzak that it is important to respect a
woman when she says "no," or to remind him that we live in a society
in which date-rape is a serious problem, seems almost beside the
point. Grace did leave the wedding. He and Grace are in love.
The soap opera suggests that we might want to be like Kuzak,
but only if this love is true. To be able to reveal themselves, soap
operas value characters being honest about themselves. Proclaiming
his honesty about his own passions, Kuzak does not censor himself in
talking with the rape victim and repeatedly pressures Grace to con-
front whether her love for her fianc6 was true. Being honest with
others, however, apparently is not required. In order to produce the
result his conscience demands, as his first case demonstrates, Kuzak is
not beyond shading the truth to his clients. His pursuit of Grace, too,
was paved with half-truths, if not lies. He lunches with Grace's
fianc6, seeking to gain an advantage in his romantic pursuit, and
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doesn't disclose his interest. Kuzak controls others, including-per-
haps especially-Grace, not through honesty, but through charm and
expertise. The law has not taught Kuzak the values of individual
autonomy and of the diversity of opinion, but rather the artful devices
of cunning and persuasion.
Kuzak, consequently, is dependent on his being able to control
others. For example, after a bar grievance committee disciplined
Kuzak, the senior partner, knowing that Kuzak had done wrong but
confronting an unrepentant Kuzak, told him: "If you expect us to fall
in line with you, you've overestimated your own importance." Kuzak
may question whether he acted unethically because of his inability to
lead his partners, even if he is morally deaf to the committee's deci-
sion and the judgments of his partners.
Kuzak's lack of honesty with others can be criticized within the
soap opera frame. Kuzak expresses himself. But are others allowed
to express their full selves? He leads others. But does his leadership
lead them to value honesty, even as it forces them to turn away from
lies?55 By manipulating others to accord with the dictates of his pas-
sions, Kuzak does not so much serve others as stifle their protests
against his convictions. Grace does fall in love with Mike. But she
has lost not only her judicial race, but also a marriage commitment.
Try placing yourself in Grace's shoes during her walk on the beach
with Kuzak. Still wearing her wedding dress, she hears Kuzak telling
her he is not ready for commitment. Do you feel that she has lost
something of value?
Of course, Grace chose to leave her wedding. In displaying the
rule of his heart, Kuzak relies on others being free to make their own
choices. Grace might not have left with him; it was that which cre-
ated the dramatic tension in Kuzak's wedding appearance. Had he
been wrong, had Grace not walked out with a man in a gorilla suit,
his appearance at the ceremony would have been ridiculous. Having
correctly judged Grace's response, he is difficult to fault. She did
choose him. As L.A. Law's frame suggests, if their relationship is
both good and bad for her, she cannot blame Kuzak for making it
possible for her to flee her wedding ceremony. Like him, she will bear
the' burden of her choices.
Even when freely made, however, choices on soap operas must be
criticized for the limited costs attached to them. Like all the other ills
that beset soap opera characters, Grace's loss of a judgeship does not
55. Cf. Shaffer, The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 U. PiTr. L. REV. 197-204 (1981)
(describing how the fictional lawyer in H. LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960) led his
community to value honesty).
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prevent her from displaying her character. Freed from the force of
circumstance, Grace will find next week yet another exciting,
rewarding, and revealing challenge.
Kuzak's clients and their families, like Grace's fianc6 and family,
are not regular characters on the series. How do we judge Kuzak if
we take these characters into our concern? Grace may have chosen
Kuzak because of his character. But did his clients? Have Kuzak's
clients chosen to be part of his community of fate?56 If not, is Kuzak
justified in imposing the demands of his passions on his clients?
L.A. Law's portrayal of Kuzak reminds us of the appeal and lim-
itations of characters who follow the law of their heart. We are
drawn to such people. They have a child-like innocence. But we
must also ask: "What is the cost of such sincerity?" Early in their
relationship, Grace cold-shouldered Mike: "It's a nice thing about
being grown up. Having feelings doesn't mean we have to act on
them." She had a point." In emphasizing that character must be
judged, soaps teach an important truth: In devoting ourselves to
others, we do put ourselves at risk. In portraying characters, like
Kuzak, who follow the law of their heart, unfortunately, L.A. Law
suggests that all we can do is choose to whose passions we subject
ourselves.
If everyone is not free to display her character, or if passions
conflict with dependency because the force of circumstance is felt, an
individual's display of character may not only be frustrated, but may
also be irresponsible. Consequently, especially under conditions of
unequal power, we might be leary about displays of character. Profes-
sionals hold our fortunes and sometimes our lives in their hands. Can
we trust that they will have the character of a Dr. Welby, let alone a
Michael Kuzak? Our lack of trust appears to demand that we impose
job-rules on professionals to constrain their power.
Yet L.A. Law also suggests that clients can choose lawyers on the
basis of their character, and be ethically served when their lawyers are
56. An episode in which Cifuentes stopped the passive euthanasia of a young comatose
woman emphasized that lawyers can walk out of their clients' lives. The episode ends with
closing elevator doors separating a morally troubled Cifuentes from the parent who must
continue to care for the comatose client Cifuentes represented.
57. It is a point with a philosophic pedigree. As Judith Shklar stated:
The feeling of being open and sincere in one's relations to others gives one an
immediate and certain feeling of one's own purity and goodness. It offers a sense
of one's liberty which no amount of rational obedience to duty can rival ....
Sincerity and contempt for others are intimately related . . . . Egotism in its
moral forms is still selfishness.
J. SHKLAR, FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF
HEGEL'S Phenomenology of Mind 113 (1976) (summarizing Hegel's criticism of Romanticism).
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guided by their own character, not professional rules. The protection
of the ethical rules, even if necessary for third parties, is not needed
for lawyers and clients who are committed to each other.
We might conclude from this analysis of Kuzak in light of the
soap opera frame that we live in a society in which we are so fright-
ened of each other that we demand that both others and ourselves
assume the safe role of faceless bureaucrats and consumers. We rele-
gate characters who express themselves to fiction, such as television
and novels. In a mobile, complex, pluralistic society, we are ambiva-
lent. We value character, but we need rules to constrain discretion.
L.A. Law may portray lawyers of moral worth who do not follow the
codes of ethics that the profession promulgates and law professors
inculcate. But this portrayal, we might conclude, leads to ambiva-
lence: On the one hand, lawyers' consciences are not left at home
when they go to work; on the other, shouldn't a lawyer at work be
armed with more than her conscience?
Having evaluated Kuzak by L.A. Law's frame, we understand
that we are ambivalent about the moral worth of soap operas. Some-
times we see in soap operas the use of dramatic license to deny falsely
the compulsive force of circumstance. At other times, we see them
teaching us that we cannot blame circumstances for the choices we
make.
Yet the popularity of L.A. Law demands further explanation.
Ambivalence is not the reaction L.A. Law usually generates. Even
when Kuzak's characterological weaknesses are appreciated, his dis-
play of character is admired. In the next Section, I argue that this
response derives from our shared commitments to the privileging of
character and autonomy for professionals at work. By instantiating
these commitments, L.A. Law attains its popularity. In depicting law-
yers living the good life, L.A. Law challenges the legal profession to
improve the possibilities for lawyers to display their character in their
work.
IV. THE PRIVILEGING OF CHARACTER AND LEGAL ETHICS: THE
GOOD LIFE AND THE LIFE OF A GOOD LAWYER
Fantasy, as Freud understood, offers a path for insight: Dreams
can be interpreted." It is by empathizing with fictional characters
like Kuzak that we express our hopes and desires. But fantasies need
reality testing. I do not gainsay this response. In the previous Sec-
58. Thorburn argues that a melodrama even if an "escape from reality ... must still
instruct us, with whatever obliqueness, concerning the nature of that reality from which escape
or respite has been sought." Thorburn, supra note 44, at 75.
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tion, I applied it to Kuzak's character. Yet this response obscures
part of the matter. L.A. Law's popular fantasy offers insight into our
shared culture. In particular, it helps explain the public's general hos-
tility toward lawyers.
If displays of character must be constrained, why is the public so
hostile toward lawyers who practice and teach this truth? Perhaps it
is because we hate the messengers of this bleak winter's tale. This
explanation, however, forgets that this tale has many tellers not so
despised and, as L.A. Law depicts, the public does not see lawyers as
necessary messengers of this tale.5 9 Another explanation of public
59. Robert Post explains "the special hatred that popular culture holds for the lawyer" as
functioning to repress our fear that we don't possess "a stable, coherent, and sincerely
presented self." Post, supra note 50, at 389. Lawyers show us "our own dark reflection." To
distort this reflection, we hate lawyers, those "bearers of that bleak winter's tale." Id. at 386.
In appearing to the public to separate their character from what they do, however,
lawyers do not reflect the common fear that each of us lacks a stable character. Unlike
lawyers, we commonly risk exposure by "the concealed performances we must undertake
every day." Id. at 389. When we pose-to get a job, for example-we risk both unmasking
and, if we get the job, enforced pretense. The public believes that lawyers are different.
Lawyers, they believe, have excepted themselves from facing these risks when they pose to win
a case; then, their characters are not on trial.
The bar has not done an adequate job of teaching that men and women of good character
would pose as lawyers do. Yet lawyers demand class status and personal respect.
Accordingly, public hostility toward lawyers primarily expresses anger at a claimed exception
from the privileging of character that the public both envies and despises.
Part of the pleasure of Post's analysis is that, by casting the lawyer as the public's
reflection, he sidesteps arrogance while presenting the public as unwilling to face the truth. It
is not, Post argues, that the public is immature. Everybody, lawyers included, fear confronting
their dark reflection.
But has Post sidestepped arrogance, or relocated it? Post argues that the hostility reflects
a cultural problem that does not demand a response from the legal profession. The problem is
that our culture does not prepare us to see that we are composed of false selves. If so, the Bar
should respond to the public's hostility as should a rubber-chicken luncheon audience that
hears a speaker telling a sexist joke; by not laughing, we inform the speaker that the joke is on
him.
Post's analysis would apply if the speaker was the object of the hostility and vicious
humor he describes. The black humor of the operating room and adolescent clowning are
explainable because these behaviors relieve pressures and deny dark fears. Coser, Role
Distance, Sociological Ambivalence, and Transitional Status Systems, 72 AM. J. Soc. 173
(1966). Post's analysis certainly explains the feelings in a law school student show.
Hostility and viscious humor about others, however, expresses ambivalence about
relations with the targeted population. Katz, Glass, Lucido & Fauber, Ambivalence, Guilt and
the Denigration of a Physically Handicapped Victim, 45 J. PERSONALITY 419 (1977). Lawyer
humor is closer to racist and sexist humor than it is to defensive, self-denigrating humor. Like
relations between sons and mothers-in-law, members of a modern nuclear family, and
members of different racial and sexual groups, relations between clients and lawyers are put
into issue by using hostile humor about lawyers.
The analysis I am offering suggests that we should not be reassured. In public hostility to
lawyers, I see a protest against the status quo. Jokes can be a way of saying, "No." The legal
profession must respond because the public is challenging the lawyer exception from our
culture's privileging of character. As the previous Section accented, the profession must
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hostility is that the public immaturely responds to constraints on
character: The public holds lawyers guilty by their association with
guilty clients.6" But the likeability of L.A. Law lawyers, even when
they represent repulsive clients, suggests the public is not so imma-
ture. There is a different explanation of public hostility that does not
require derogating the public and is consistent with the popularity of
L.A. Law: The public is hostile toward lawyers who deny that their
characters are at risk in their actions as lawyers. Lawyers, like those
on L.A. Law, who express themselves in their practices, taking per-
sonal responsibility for their difficult choices, do not generate hostility
and are even likeable.
L.A. Law projects many messages and biases. But to the extent it
is a soap opera, it projects commitments to two propositions: First,
the privileging of character means that lawyers should practice law
differently and should be judged by their characters; 6' second, circum-
stance-environments and institutions-should be criticized for
preventing the display of character.62 In the previous Section, I noted
that judging a character's ethics requires analyzing the situations in
which they act. In this Section, I describe how institutions, such as
the law, are judged by the opportunities and constraints they offer the
explain why the demands of legal ethics ought to constrain even good characters. As this
Section suggests, it must justify why legal institutions must constrain the characters who
inhabit them.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
61. Each lawyer does possess a personal ethical code. Spiegel, Lawyering and Client
Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 117
n.315 (1979). The cultural commitment is to recognize these codes. Martin Luther King did
express our culture's values in his dream that someday men and women will "live in a nation
where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character,"
Keynote Address by Martin Luther King during the March on Washington, D.C. for Civil
Rights (Aug. 28, 1963), reprinted in 31 NEGRO HISTORY BULLETIN 217 (May 1968), and not
by their professional status, nor their compliance with positive rules.
62. According to standard analysis, in our culture, groups are artificial, analyzable only by
reference to the individuals who join them. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 125 (1975)
(principle of aggregation). As suggested in the previous Section, and by many others, ethical
analysis can be distorted by analysis based on the fantasy that we are "true selves independent
of any cultural or social influence, being responsible to that self alone, and making its
fulfillment the very meaning of our lives." R. BELLAH, supra note 23, at 150. Individualism
and intentionalism unreasonably taint our ethical reasoning.
In this Section, I suggest that this fantasy reflects a cultural commitment- whose moral
significance remains to be explored-to groups and institutions being justified by the range of
characters they can support. On television, even police departments are justified by their
abilities to employ a wide range of characters. Their ability to catch crooks appears to be less
significant than their ability to employ characters like Lieutenant Columbo. Even Dragnet,
perhaps the most rule-bound of TV police series, was popular primarily because, unlike its
many competitors, the public empathized with the character of Joe Friday, "the 'low pressure'
cop." R. Denney, The Plainest Plain-Clothesman, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 1955, at 14. The
L.A.P.D., in turn, was legitimized because it allowed Joe Friday to display his character.
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characters who inhabit them. As I read L.A. Law, one of the princi-
pal virtues of McKenzie, Brackman, Chaney & Kuzak is that it offers
Benny Stollwitz (Larry Drake), an individual with special needs, the
opportunity to work and be recognized.
At its best, L.A. Law resembles nothing so much as that antece-
dent of the soap opera, the novel of manners. While its more recent
characterizations and plottings have varied from the standard set by
its opening episodes, L.A. Law can elicit the tension between the char-
acter of the actors and the morality demanded by their society. L.A.
Law can be an absurdist play, but at its best, by juxtaposing character
and incident, it can challenge social institutions by the moralities of
its lawyers' characters.63
We know that action normally is not determined solely by char-
acter, unconstrained by circumstance. We know soap operas nor-
mally offer only a thin, one-dimensional depiction of reality.
Consider, for example, one of the deals of Dallas' J.R. Ewing. We
may watch it, smile, and think: "That's J.R. for you." We may see
parts of our boss in J.R. But, we know that our bosses, even those we
dislike or envy, do not act like J.R. We know they cannot be like
J.R., even if they wanted. J.R. may not be a stick figure, but the
Ewing business is a thin paste-up of an oil company. We all know
that we do not learn much about the oil business from watching
Dallas.
L.A. Law is not a lawyer procedural; it does not portray lawyers'
work realistically.'M Yet L.A. Law does generate moments of recogni-
tion. Haven't you watched L.A. Law and felt you have seen lawyers
or judges that you know? 65  Isn't it when L.A. Law lawyers sidestep
63. Cf. Coles, Legal Ethics.- The Question of Principalities and Powers, 21 B.C.L. REV.
1017, 1021-22 (1980) (discussing novels).
64. I can accept the dramatic license in giving the members of the firm of McKenzie,
Brackman, Chaney & Kuzak a broader range of clients and cases than is realistic: How many
small Los Angeles law firms have work ranging from criminal defense to corporate
acquisition? In how many law offices do business executives rub shoulders with violent
criminals and divorcing spouses? But all lawyers spend considerable time reading; this is not
depicted on L.A. Law. Most lawyers spend much more time researching than meeting; on L.A.
Law, the reverse is portrayed. Litigators spend vastly more time on the grit of discovery and
preparation than they do at trial; L.A. Law's lawyers apparently go to court unsupported by
painstaking. research. The work done prior to negotiations is similarly slighted for the drama
of the negotiation itself. Television critic John O'Connor points out that L.A. Law fits squarely
in the "familiar television abyss of terminal cuteness." O'Connor, supra note 6, at 35. From
Bochco and Fisher, I expected, at the least, but have not received, lawyers who, like Hill
Street's Belker, are continuously frustrated by interrupting phone calls.
65. Judge Abner Mikva has not. Mikva, 'L.A. Law'--Is It Law or Is It Just L.A.?, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 15, 1987, § 2, at 31, col. 4. Because it is not realistic, Judge Mikva argues that
L.A. Law is not informative about legal practice: " 'L.A. Law' spends considerable time on the
characteristics of the law partners and the relationship between them. In this respect, it does a
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the demands of their role or the expectations of others, that lawyers
ask each other: "Isn't that just something that Jim would do?" Not
because Jim would realistically do just that, but because Jim would
like to do that. That is the way Jim treats fortune and necessity when
he gets a chance. The Lydian Ring of Gyges does not reveal what is
just, but it helps us illuminate our account of motivation. L.A. Law's
frame, with its depiction of an unreal freedom and its portrayal of
characters who do not blame the force of circumstance for the choices
they make, reflects the way in which we approach moral dilemmas:
Individuals facing moral conflict reason as if they could control their
actions and feel regret for succumbing to the force of circumstance.66
The appeal of L.A. Law's frame expresses a commitment that
withstands the recognition that even the hands of good character need
to be bound by the demands of ethics. By insisting that we judge
Kuzak's character, we reveal demands for autonomous work. In gos-
siping about Kuzak, we express desires to be able to express ourselves
in work. Withstanding cynicism, the popularity of L.A. Law
instances a cultural commitment, whose realization ought to be con-
strained by ethical demands, that lawyers can have a career that
allows them to recognize themselves and others.
L.A. Law's popularity reflects a conjunction between the soap
opera genre's depiction of characters freed from the force of circum-
stance and one of our culturally valued images of modern profession-
als, including lawyers. The professions have a special place in our
society. Professional status ideally affords autonomy at work to indi-
viduals. In judging individual actions, we may be ambivalent about
the constraints that ethics imposes on characters: Professionals either
separate their work from their character, impoverishing them and
rousing our hostility, or they express their character, allowing possi-
good job-sometimes." Id. at 37. Nonetheless, Judge Mikva concludes, "the people look
three-dimensional but not very real" because the lawyers "appear to work with smoke and
mirrors to win tough cases" and "[t]he cases ... do not sound like the bill of fare of any real
law firm." Id. I agree that L.A. Law is not realistic. I do not conclude that it cannot
consequently describe motivations or be informative. See supra note 39.
A different explanation for Judge Mikva's position is that he possesses a vision I lack. We
know weakness in narrative when character and incident are unconvincingly connected. I may
not be able to see L.A. Law's weakness because, unlike Judge Mikva, I (and other L.A. Law
fans) lack convincing connections between character and incident in legal practice.
66. Williams, Ethical Consistency, in MORAL DILEMMAS 115 (C. Gowans, ed. 1987)
(discussing conflicts of beliefs and conflicts of desire). Such individuals wish to be gentle men
and women: "A gentleman can live through anything. He faces anything. A gentleman
accepts the responsibility of his actions and bears the burden of their consequences, even
though he did not himself instigate them but only acquiesced to them, didn't say No though he
knew he should." W. FAULKNER, THE REIVERS 302 (1962), quoted in Shaffer, The Legal
Ethics of the Two Kingdoms, 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 3, 7 n.15 (1983).
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ble self-deceptions and rousing our fears. In judging the professional
role, however, we are committed to professional status affording some
citizens the privilege of having the autonomy to express their charac-
ter at work.
It ought to be the genius of the rules of legal ethics that they
provide structured limits within which lawyers can practice differ-
ently.67 But exiles from legal practice, the writers of L.A. Law, testify
that current legal practice does not afford these opportunities.68
Reports from exiles, of course, are not the most accurate source of
information. But they are consistent with a role-differentiated moral-
ity that is justified in terms of the interests of clients and the public.
Perhaps fearing its materialistic overtones, the profession has not
spent as much attention on detailing how the practice of law allows
for the good life. Perhaps assuming that living in the law will furnish
one with the prerequisites for living well, we have not detailed how
practice can express lawyers' characters, a requirement for us of the
good life. These questions must be addressed, if not for all lawyers, at
least for those students who enter the profession because L.A. Law
"has made a legal career seem attractive.
'69
The privileging of character means that we demand more than a
role-differentiated morality and a vision that the good lawyer obeys
ethical rules promulgated by the bar. For us, the ability to express
our character tests professional rules. For us, professional rules can-
not be justified only by their constituting a balance between individual
and social needs. For us, it must be possible for persons to live well as
lawyers, including being known by their character.7 °
The profession's ethical rules do ensure opportunities for lawyers
67. L.A. Law certainly reminds us of the truth that discretionary decisions are never just
tactical. They are informed and affected by our vision. Lawyers with differing characters do
practice differently. Our virtue follows us into both our public and private lives.
Consequently, any adequate legal ethic must allow for the presence of character. Cf.
Kronman, supra note 16, at 871 (judgment is characterological); Schneyer, supra note 32, at
956 (codes give "leeway" for lawyer "to take her off-the-job values into account").
68. One left legal practice, he reports, suffering from a self-diagnosed case of "acute
motivational deprivation syndrome." Orey, supra note 14, at 34. Another left "[t]o escape
frustration and boredom as a junior associate." Id. at 35. Another describes the conflict he
experienced between the realities of practice and "every law student's delusion" that "you're
going to practice law in a firm where ... all the lawyers lead interesting lives." Id. at 36.
69. Id. at 38 (quoting an admissions officer at Harvard Law School who attempts to
explain a rise in law school applications by the popularity of L.A. Law in that "everyone
realizes that there is an element of truth that the show has made a legal career seem
attractive.").
70. According to Monroe Freedman, the ethical lawyer displays character in the decisions
to begin and withdraw from representation. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a
Professional System, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 191 (1978). Although Monroe Freedman's
argument might demonstrate that a good person can be a lawyer, if these are the only decisions
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to live well. Lord Brougham overstates his case:7' At least some
hazards to the lawyer are included in legal ethical reasoning. 72 These
ought not to be understood only as concessions to the profession's
interest in maintaining its cartel power.73 If these professional rules
do not sustain unethical actions, they are justified by sustaining insti-
tutions in which individuals have access to the good life.
The privileging of character means that pedagogy in professional
ethics includes convincing students that they have characters that
lead them to comply with the demands of legal ethics. It is no acci-
dent that law school technical education is conceptualized as teaching
students to "think like a lawyer." The privileging of character, rein-
forced by the autonomy claims of the professions, requires lawyers to
"be" lawyers, not just to have certain skills. 74 The old wisdom that
every class in law school taught legal ethics reflects a commitment to
the practice of law being expressive of character.75
The privileging of character also means that our desire for more
humane institutions in which we have the freedom to express our-
selves is not only or even primarily an ethical imperative. It is a cul-
turally codified choice. The arguments against an amoral morality
restate a cultural value.76 We demand that institutions accommodate
various characters and moral deliberation about character.77 This
in which lawyer character is recognized, he has not demonstrated that a good lawyer can live a
good life.
71. See supra text accompanying note 2.
72. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983) (authorizing a
lawyer to reveal confidential "information relating to representation of a client ... to establish
a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client").
73. Contra Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers.- A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes,
59 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1981).
74. Cf B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM 159-202 (1976) (describing
how careers define professional self-identity).
75. The old wisdom also reflects that, in our society, morality that is differentiated and
esoteric does not express character. Such moralities have the status of etiquette.
Consequently, the functions of a role-differentiated morality are analyzed by the tools of
criticism developed for analyzing etiquette and other structurally created social norms. See
Rhode, supra note 73.
76. This value is also found in other television shows, like Ben Casey and Dr. Kildare:
"While 'Medic' had focused upon the discipline of medicine, Kildare and Casey dwelt upon its
practice." Alley, Media Medicine and Morality, in UNDERSTANDING TELEVISION: ESSAYS
ON TELEVISION AS A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FORCE, supra note 44, at 231, 233. Alley
further stated: "ABC's Casey['s] ... sense of justice transcended the protocol of his profession
.... [L]ike Casey, Kildare often found just causes more important than surgical techniques
and he was willing to challenge authority for such causes," Id.
77. We demand of institutions that which Bernard Shaw depicted about our meta-
institution, language. B. SHAW, ANDROCLES AND THE LION OVERRULED, PYGMALION
(1916). Eliza Doolittle's character is neither oppressed nor limited when Henry Higgens
institutionalizes her speech. The discipline of "proper" English, instead, affords her wild,
native tongue greater freedom.
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charge requires us to design institutions that meet the demands of the
textured complexity of character. Institutions that include as charac-
ters only shepherds and sheep (rule-enunciators and rule-compliers),
for example, fail to meet the test imposed by our privileging of charac-
ter. In affirming the privileging of character, L.A. Law reminds us
that we must "consider how institutions need to be changed in order
to encourage and sustain a fuller individual and communal life."
'7 8
Unfortunately, although committed to the privileging of charac-
ter, our current understandings provide only a thinly developed
account of character.7 9 For us, cultural criticism is necessary.8"
Kuzak's character might have all the substance of Muzak. For us,
integrity may be reduced to sincerity. We might seek exemplars in
"stars" projecting contrived images. Individualism may be the con-
tent of our morality. But such is our fate. As long as character is
privileged, people will empathize with "stars." This empathy repre-
sents a strongly embedded, historically funded, and culturally sanc-
tioned vision of the good life. Our task must be to educate people
about who is admirable and why. We must be able to distinguish
between character and its simulacra.8 ' Moral deliberation about
character must transcend the conversations depicted on L.A. Law,
which seem to consist entirely of people saying to each other "do
what you have to do." We apparently lack an account of character
growth and development. All too often understanding one's motiva-
78. Lasky, "Is One Ethic Enough?," 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 43, 51 (1983).
79. Of course, it could be argued that our cultural privileging of character is itself wrong.
I agree that our culture's privileging must be criticized, but I am not convinced that the fact of
privileging is not either politically justifiable, see infra note 82, or unwarranted. Philip
Selznick reminds us of Dewey's insight "that the most important human and institutional
choices are character-defining choices." Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75
CAL. L. REV. 445, 459 (1987). In a recent book, Harry Levin, like Robert Post, sees the subject
matter of comedy playing along the incongruities created by the fault-lines formed in the
struggle between legalism and communitarianism, between form and substance, and between
lower and higher aspirations. To Levin, comedy is always about the confrontation between
killjoys and playboys. Unlike Post, however, Levin concludes that the comic spirit
demonstrates the privileging of the playboy, the privileging of our desire to express ourselves.
H. LEVIN, PLAYBOYS AND KILLJOYS: AN ESSAY ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
COMEDY (1987).
80. In our culture, for example, an individual's character is taken to be compromised by
joining a group. See supra note 62 (artificiality of groups); supra note 50 (mythic individuality
lies outside community). This romantic view demands criticism. As Amanda Cross (Carolyn
Heilbrun) observes: "You take the worst feature of the life-subservience for the wife,
isolation for the cowboy-and you glamorize it, you give the wives or cowboys the language in
which to describe to themselves the romance of their situation .... Roman[ce], in my lexicon,
means unreal, glossed over with a false attractiveness to entrap those who will not see through
the gloss to the truth beneath." A. CROSS, No WORD FROM WINIFRED 30-33 (1986).
81. Our understanding of character is bound up with images and ephemera. See D.
BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA (1987).
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tions is taken as equivalent to improvements in moral capacity. 2
L.A. Law ought to remind us as well that we significantly repress,
or at least do not readily accept, that institutions can justifiably form
or limit characters.8 3 In empathizing with characters freed from the
force of circumstance, we fail to consider how institutions ought to
socialize character. L.A. Law, like other cultural products, signifi-
cantly represses how "[tihe individual still depends upon shared and
coherent institutions to achieve stability and responsibility for life."
8s4
We avoid confronting this dependence, preferring to institute formally
impersonal rules, rather than detailing how character can both pre-
serve and erode institutions.8 5
Because of the privileging of character, we demand from institu-
tions that they do more than efficiently allocate decisionmaking: We
want honest wares, upright lines, sterling labors, virtuous attempts,
and solid citizens. But we find ourselves like Babbitt, the famous stu-
dent of the spiritual and moral side of American institutions, forming
"mechanical friendships"8 6 and beset by "a cold feeling of insignifi-
82. For example, on a day-time courtroom drama, The Judge, an Assistant District
Attorney justifies the seemingly immoral imposition on her of a child abuse case by the fact
that it led her to remember her own abuse as a child. Even if we disregarded the quality of
representation she was able to deliver, it takes a rather strong intentionalism to move from
memory to moral development, especially if we take into account the lack of social support
that many women are offered. But this triumph of ego also marks American culture and must
be confronted. See R. JACOBY, SOCIAL AMNESIA: A CRITIQUE OF CONFORMIST
PSYCHOLOGY FROM ADLER TO LAING (1975) (ego psychology develops in America, instead of
a more radical psychological theory); PHILIP RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC:
USES OF FAITH AFTER FREUD (1966) (medical curing therapy arises in America, instead of a
more socially-contextualized and conditional practice).
83. Consequently, "[t]hese cultural sources also tell us that bad people cause problems,
rather than society and its institutions." Macaulay, supra note 40, at 208.
84. Lasky, supra note 77, at 51. Soap operas confirm this repression:
Since the characters are destabilized, they can do anything; but since they answer
neither to God nor to any framework of social conventions, it is hard to know
whom or what they do answer to. 'Themselves' is probably the missing word,
but since these new selves appear to consist of such replaceable circuitry, it's hard
to know what that means, either.
Arlen, supra note 47, at 180 (drawing similarities between characters in Dallas and Scruples).
Emphasis on the display of individual character falsely idealizes free subjects, blocking inquiry
into the preconditions and quality of their freedom.
85. For example, recently we have elected Presidents who portray themselves as anti-
bureaucratic loners. We need to understand the consequences of such character myths. We
have found, somewhat to our shock, that, once in office, such characters are prone to
incompetency and manipulative evasion of bureaucratic regulations. Voters may have wanted
a President who would staff the bureaucracies with men like Oliver North. At the same time,
the costs of electing such characters were not recognized. Like the artist in B. SHAW, THE
DOCTOR'S DILEMMA, GETTING MARRIED, AND THE SHEWING-UP OF BIANCO POSNET
(1911), we value displays of self, without envisioning how this might help our doctors find it
easier not to save our lives.
86. S. LEWIS, BABBITT 234 (1922).
1260
ETHICAL SOAP L.A. LAW
cance in his heart."87 To the question of whether or not Kuzak
should have accepted his cases, we have little to say except either that
he should not do what he does not want to do, or that, if he could not
have followed the rules, he should not have put himself in those situa-
tions.8 8 The weakness of legal ethics has its source in the weakness of
our understanding of how the good life is linked to the virtue of
institutions.
Given deficits in our understanding of the social dependence of
character, the privileging of character concentrates attention on the
attitude individuals take toward the force of circumstance-including
ethical rules. What do we accept as given? When do we refuse to be
held accountable? What do we take as the results of fortune? These
have become, for us, the choices of moral significance.
Nonetheless, the appeal of L.A. Law reaffirms that, for us, the
character we display is a moral choice. What institutions we serve
and how we serve them reflects our character. Our morality-our
character-is determined, at least in part, by our choices about where
and what to practice and what to leave unchanged when we enter
those contexts. In short, L.A. Law teaches that our individual moral-
ity matters. Sounds sappy. But what did you expect from a discus-
sion of television?
87. Id. at 162.
88. The text summarizes my teaching experience. I suspect it does not indicate an artifact
of my teaching. Public discussion of Oliver North was consistent with my experience. Those
who criticized him normally did so for his violation of laws or his political vision. Not many
criticized him for having the wrong character for the job he had assumed. As usual,
Christopher Hitchens was largely alone: "Men like North can be found at gun clubs, beer-
belly reunions and charismatic tent meetings from sea to polluted sea.... The only interesting
question about such a classic, banal type is this: How did he become the special executioner
for a nominally democratic government?" Hitchens, Minority Report, 245 NATION 80 (Aug.
1/8, 1987). Denby argues that our valuing of sincerity demonstrates that we "no longer have a
culture and a set of standards ... short of the law, of judging anything." Denby, Ollie North,
The Movie, 197 NEw REPUBLIC 9 (Aug. 3, 1987); see also Post, supra note 50, at 386 ("[W]e
are in a state of such uncertainty concerning the meaning of authenticity,"). Denby warns us
against valuing self-displays: "North is a classic authoritarian personality-charismatic, self-
dramatizing, a dreamer who dreamed himself .... When we look at his face we should feel
not love but fear. Or rather: one thing to be frightened of is the love that the face inspires."
Denby, supra, at 9. Like Denby, I agree that popular appeal must be counted and analyzed.
Unlike Denby, I find in our culture a value: The privileging of character. I share Denby's fear
of authoritarian personalities. But I believe that a recognition of the privileging of character
and moral deliberation about its demands are better avenues to guard our future than shouting
at people not to idealize stars. It is an open question whether privileging character will lead to
authoritarianism or a rich pluralism. I am only slightly reassured by the fact that, like
Hitchens, we can condemn North for being the right character in the wrong movie,
1989]
